Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 68(1), 1–13

Baker, J. (1987)

Judith Baker’s paper examines the concept of trust and its relation to rationality and morality. She distinguishes three kinds of trust: taking things on trust, trusting someone based on impressions, and trusting a friend despite counter-evidence. She argues that the third kind of trust, which she calls friendship trust, poses a challenge to the standard picture of rationality, which requires beliefs to be based on evidence and adjusted according to rules. Baker claims that friendship trust is not irrational, but rather a form of commitment that outruns the evidence and resists counter-evidence. The paper also suggests that trust is necessary for morality and interpersonal relationships, as it enables respect, cooperation, and openness. Baker concludes by proposing some ways to understand the rationality of trust as a kind of implicit commitment that is not subject to voluntary control. This article is significant because it raises important questions about the nature and value of trust, and how it differs from other forms of belief. The author also offers a good account of the role of trust in friendship and morality.